From 91917c6413d6daedccc80aed3ceac353fadc20af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marty Pradere <martyp@labkey.com>
Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 12:49:35 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Document Git branch naming and PR conventions in
 CLAUDE.md

Add Git Branch Naming section covering develop, feature branches
(snake_case label), release-targeted branches, and SNAPSHOT/release
branches. Expand Pull Request Format to defer to pull_request_template.md
when present and require user confirmation before creating branches or PRs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 CLAUDE.md | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index 3960577764..0e2bcc138e 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -124,6 +124,20 @@ All external library versions are centralized in `gradle.properties` (200+ versi
 
 When searching for Java method usages, always include `*.jsp` and `*.jspf` files in addition to `*.java`. JSP files contain inline Java code and are significant callers of API methods (especially anything in `JspBase`).
 
+## Git Branch Naming
+
+- `develop` — primary development branch (protected; no direct commits).
+- `fb_<label>_<id>` — feature/bug-fix branch off `develop`. `label` is a short snake_case description (use underscores to separate words, not dashes); `id` is the issue or Scrumwise ID. Omit `_<id>` only when no ID exists (e.g., test fixes); coordinate the label to avoid collisions.
+- `XX.Y_fb_<label>_<id>` — feature/bug-fix branch targeting a specific release.
+- `releaseXX.Y-SNAPSHOT` — beta release branch (protected); base release-targeted feature branches from it.
+- `releaseXX.Y` — final release branch (protected); receives merges from the SNAPSHOT branch only. Patch releases are tagged `XX.Y.Z`.
+
+Use an identical branch name across every repo involved in a story. Branches matching these patterns are built by TeamCity — pick a non-matching name to opt out.
+
+Before creating a branch, always propose the name and confirm it with the user. Do not run `git checkout -b` (or equivalent) until the user approves.
+
 ## Pull Request Format
 
-PRs should include sections for: **Rationale** (why the change is needed), **Related Pull Requests**, and **Changes** (notable items).
\ No newline at end of file
+If the repo has a `pull_request_template.md` (typically under `.github/`), follow it. Otherwise, include sections for: **Rationale** (why the change is needed), **Related Pull Requests**, and **Changes** (notable items). Keep descriptions brief.
+
+Before opening a PR, always draft the title and description and confirm them with the user. Do not run `gh pr create` until the user approves.
\ No newline at end of file

From 97aa209288829f1f15b2dbcd064b4704001f00a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marty Pradere <martyp@labkey.com>
Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 13:26:57 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Ignore hook log output and Python bytecode

Add .claude/hooks/*.log so debug-log output from the Claude Code
PreToolUse hooks isn't tracked. Add a top-level __pycache__/ and
*.pyc section so bytecode generated by those hooks (and any other
Python under .claude/) stays out of the repo.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 .gitignore | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 9f220ceeca..9071dba2eb 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -53,5 +53,11 @@ clientAPIs/*
 .idea/vcs.xml
 .idea/sqldialects.xml
 
-# Local Claude settings
+# AI files
 .claude/settings.local.json
+.claude/hooks/*.log
+.playwright-mcp/
+
+# Python bytecode
+__pycache__/
+*.pyc
\ No newline at end of file

From 933ef6f544b5bdef186f63fd91fc9018b05cc4ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marty Pradere <martyp@labkey.com>
Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 15:43:00 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Prompt before git/gh write operations via permissions.ask

Adds permissions.ask entries so that git push/commit/reset --hard,
branch -D/creation, and gh pr create/merge/close require user
confirmation before executing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 .claude/settings.json | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json
index 3434b5ca39..00c33ce4ad 100644
--- a/.claude/settings.json
+++ b/.claude/settings.json
@@ -1,4 +1,18 @@
 {
+  "permissions": {
+    "ask": [
+      "Bash(git push:*)",
+      "Bash(git commit:*)",
+      "Bash(git reset --hard:*)",
+      "Bash(git branch -D:*)",
+      "Bash(git checkout -b:*)",
+      "Bash(git switch -c:*)",
+      "Bash(git switch -C:*)",
+      "Bash(gh pr create:*)",
+      "Bash(gh pr merge:*)",
+      "Bash(gh pr close:*)"
+    ]
+  },
   "hooks": {
     "PreToolUse": [
       {

From 7d5fbc4a5e3b2b0a5d38c63ffdd622c8d0da7173 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marty Pradere <martyp@labkey.com>
Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 15:44:06 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Add ASK tier and debug logging to PreToolUse hooks

check-dangerous-commands.py now emits permissionDecision=ask for
git/gh write operations (push, commit, reset --hard, branch -D,
branch creation, gh pr create/merge/close). Both hook scripts gain
an opt-in DEBUG log written to .claude/hooks/hooks.log. The test
harness is extended to recognize ASK alongside BLOCK/ALLOW.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 .claude/hooks/check-dangerous-commands.py | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++
 .claude/hooks/check-secrets-file.py       | 26 ++++++-
 .claude/hooks/test-hooks.py               | 91 +++++++++++++++++++----
 3 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/.claude/hooks/check-dangerous-commands.py b/.claude/hooks/check-dangerous-commands.py
index 01bc1f0380..b0cfbd3137 100644
--- a/.claude/hooks/check-dangerous-commands.py
+++ b/.claude/hooks/check-dangerous-commands.py
@@ -9,11 +9,26 @@
 import re
 import os
 import shlex
+from datetime import datetime
 
 sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
 from secrets_patterns import contains_secrets_reference, is_secrets_path
 
 
+DEBUG = False
+
+
+def _log(detail: str) -> None:
+    if not DEBUG:
+        return
+    try:
+        log_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "hooks.log")
+        with open(log_path, "a", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            fh.write(f"{datetime.now().isoformat()} check-dangerous-commands {detail}\n")
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+
+
 SHELL_OPERATORS = {"|", "||", "&", "&&", ";", ">", ">>", "<", "<<"}
 
 
@@ -50,6 +65,55 @@ def command_touches_secret(command: str) -> bool:
     return False
 
 
+GIT_ASK_PATTERNS = [
+    # Force push: match before plain push so we emit the more specific reason
+    (
+        r'\bgit\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*push\b[^\n]*(?:--force\b|--force-with-lease\b|\s-f\b)',
+        "git force-push detected — confirm before proceeding",
+    ),
+    (
+        r'\bgit\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*push\b',
+        "git push detected — confirm before proceeding",
+    ),
+    (
+        r'\bgit\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*commit\b',
+        "git commit detected — confirm before proceeding",
+    ),
+    (
+        r'\bgit\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*reset\b[^\n]*\s--hard\b',
+        "git reset --hard detected — confirm before proceeding",
+    ),
+    (
+        r'\bgit\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*branch\b[^\n]*\s(?-i:-D)\b',
+        "git branch -D detected — confirm before proceeding",
+    ),
+    (
+        r'\bgit\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*(?:checkout\s+-b|switch\s+-[cC]|branch\s+(?!-)\S+)\b',
+        "git branch creation detected — confirm name before proceeding",
+    ),
+    (
+        r'\bgh\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*pr\s+create\b',
+        "gh pr create detected — confirm title/body before proceeding",
+    ),
+    (
+        r'\bgh\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*pr\s+merge\b',
+        "gh pr merge detected — confirm before proceeding",
+    ),
+    (
+        r'\bgh\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*pr\s+close\b',
+        "gh pr close detected — confirm before proceeding",
+    ),
+]
+
+
+def check_git_for_ask(command: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
+    """Returns (should_ask, reason) for git ops that warrant a confirmation prompt."""
+    for pattern, reason in GIT_ASK_PATTERNS:
+        if re.search(pattern, command, re.IGNORECASE):
+            return True, reason
+    return False, ""
+
+
 def check_command(command: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
     """Returns (blocked, reason)"""
 
@@ -110,19 +174,36 @@ def main():
     try:
         data = json.load(sys.stdin)
     except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
+        _log("command='' decision=allow reason=unparseable-input")
         sys.exit(0)  # Can't parse input — allow and move on
 
     command = data.get("tool_input", {}).get("command", "")
     if not command:
+        _log("command='' decision=allow reason=no-command")
         sys.exit(0)
 
     blocked, reason = check_command(command)
 
     if blocked:
+        _log(f"command={command!r} decision=block reason={reason!r}")
         response = {"decision": "block", "reason": reason}
         print(json.dumps(response))
         sys.exit(2)
 
+    ask, ask_reason = check_git_for_ask(command)
+    if ask:
+        _log(f"command={command!r} decision=ask reason={ask_reason!r}")
+        response = {
+            "hookSpecificOutput": {
+                "hookEventName": "PreToolUse",
+                "permissionDecision": "ask",
+                "permissionDecisionReason": ask_reason,
+            }
+        }
+        print(json.dumps(response))
+        sys.exit(0)
+
+    _log(f"command={command!r} decision=allow")
     sys.exit(0)
 
 
diff --git a/.claude/hooks/check-secrets-file.py b/.claude/hooks/check-secrets-file.py
index c97bea416d..f1a8087ac3 100644
--- a/.claude/hooks/check-secrets-file.py
+++ b/.claude/hooks/check-secrets-file.py
@@ -8,11 +8,26 @@
 import json
 import sys
 import os
+from datetime import datetime
 
 sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
 from secrets_patterns import contains_secrets_reference, is_secrets_path, is_secrets_directory
 
 
+DEBUG = False
+
+
+def _log(detail: str) -> None:
+    if not DEBUG:
+        return
+    try:
+        log_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "hooks.log")
+        with open(log_path, "a", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            fh.write(f"{datetime.now().isoformat()} check-secrets-file {detail}\n")
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+
+
 def iter_candidate_paths(tool_input: dict) -> list[str]:
     """Collect direct and combined selectors used by file-oriented tools."""
     candidates = []
@@ -43,29 +58,36 @@ def main():
     try:
         data = json.load(sys.stdin)
     except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
+        _log("decision=allow reason=unparseable-input")
         sys.exit(0)
 
     tool_input = data.get("tool_input", {})
     candidates = iter_candidate_paths(tool_input)
     if not candidates:
+        _log("decision=allow reason=no-candidates")
         sys.exit(0)
 
     for file_path in candidates:
         if is_secrets_path(file_path) or contains_secrets_reference(file_path):
+            reason = f"Blocked: accessing potential secrets file: {file_path}"
+            _log(f"candidates={candidates!r} decision=block reason={reason!r}")
             response = {
                 "decision": "block",
-                "reason": f"Blocked: accessing potential secrets file: {file_path}"
+                "reason": reason
             }
             print(json.dumps(response))
             sys.exit(2)
         if is_secrets_directory(file_path):
+            reason = f"Blocked: accessing directory that contains secrets: {file_path}"
+            _log(f"candidates={candidates!r} decision=block reason={reason!r}")
             response = {
                 "decision": "block",
-                "reason": f"Blocked: accessing directory that contains secrets: {file_path}"
+                "reason": reason
             }
             print(json.dumps(response))
             sys.exit(2)
 
+    _log(f"candidates={candidates!r} decision=allow")
     sys.exit(0)
 
 
diff --git a/.claude/hooks/test-hooks.py b/.claude/hooks/test-hooks.py
index f22ba0c6a2..df5a29ae0e 100644
--- a/.claude/hooks/test-hooks.py
+++ b/.claude/hooks/test-hooks.py
@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ def load_hook_commands():
     return commands
 
 
-def run_hook_test(script_name, tool_input, description, should_block):
-    """Run a single hook test case."""
+def run_hook_test(script_name, tool_input, description, expected):
+    """Run a single hook test case. expected is one of 'BLOCK', 'ASK', 'ALLOW'."""
     hook_input = json.dumps({"tool_input": tool_input})
     script_path = os.path.join(SCRIPT_DIR, script_name)
 
@@ -78,21 +78,28 @@ def run_hook_test(script_name, tool_input, description, should_block):
         text=True,
     )
 
-    was_blocked = result.returncode == 2
-    passed = was_blocked == should_block
-
-    status = "PASS" if passed else "FAIL"
-    expected = "BLOCK" if should_block else "ALLOW"
-    actual = "BLOCK" if was_blocked else "ALLOW"
-
+    actual = "ALLOW"
     detail = ""
-    if was_blocked and result.stdout.strip():
+    if result.returncode == 2:
+        actual = "BLOCK"
+        if result.stdout.strip():
+            try:
+                resp = json.loads(result.stdout.strip())
+                detail = f" -- {resp.get('reason', '')}"
+            except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                detail = f" -- {result.stdout.strip()}"
+    elif result.returncode == 0 and result.stdout.strip():
         try:
             resp = json.loads(result.stdout.strip())
-            detail = f" -- {resp.get('reason', '')}"
+            hso = resp.get("hookSpecificOutput") or {}
+            if hso.get("permissionDecision") == "ask":
+                actual = "ASK"
+                detail = f" -- {hso.get('permissionDecisionReason', '')}"
         except json.JSONDecodeError:
-            detail = f" -- {result.stdout.strip()}"
+            pass
 
+    passed = actual == expected
+    status = "PASS" if passed else "FAIL"
     print(f"  [{status}] {description:45s}  expected={expected}  actual={actual}{detail}")
     return passed
 
@@ -231,7 +238,63 @@ def tally(result):
             "check-dangerous-commands.py",
             {"command": cmd},
             desc,
-            should_block,
+            "BLOCK" if should_block else "ALLOW",
+        ))
+
+    # =========================================================================
+    print()
+    print("--- check-dangerous-commands.py git-ask patterns ---")
+    print()
+
+    GIT_ASK_TESTS = [
+        # ASK: git commit variants
+        ("git commit (bare)", "git commit", "ASK"),
+        ("git commit -m", "git commit -m 'msg'", "ASK"),
+        ("git commit -am", "git commit -am 'msg'", "ASK"),
+        ("git commit --amend", "git commit --amend", "ASK"),
+        ("git commit --allow-empty", "git commit --allow-empty -m hi", "ASK"),
+
+        # ASK: git push variants
+        ("git push (bare)", "git push", "ASK"),
+        ("git push origin main", "git push origin main", "ASK"),
+        ("git push --force", "git push --force origin main", "ASK"),
+        ("git push --force-with-lease", "git push --force-with-lease", "ASK"),
+        ("git push -f", "git push -f origin main", "ASK"),
+
+        # ASK: git reset --hard
+        ("git reset --hard", "git reset --hard", "ASK"),
+        ("git reset --hard HEAD~1", "git reset --hard HEAD~1", "ASK"),
+        ("git reset --hard origin/main", "git reset --hard origin/main", "ASK"),
+
+        # ASK: git branch -D (force delete)
+        ("git branch -D", "git branch -D feature/foo", "ASK"),
+
+        # ASK: gh pr write actions
+        ("gh pr create", "gh pr create --title foo --body bar", "ASK"),
+        ("gh pr merge", "gh pr merge 123 --squash", "ASK"),
+        ("gh pr close", "gh pr close 123", "ASK"),
+
+        # ALLOW: read-only or non-destructive git/gh ops should pass through
+        ("git log", "git log --oneline", "ALLOW"),
+        ("git diff", "git diff HEAD~1", "ALLOW"),
+        ("git fetch", "git fetch origin", "ALLOW"),
+        ("git pull", "git pull origin main", "ALLOW"),
+        ("git branch -d (lowercase, soft delete)", "git branch -d feature/foo", "ALLOW"),
+        ("git reset --soft", "git reset --soft HEAD~1", "ALLOW"),
+        ("git reset HEAD~1 (no --hard)", "git reset HEAD~1", "ALLOW"),
+        ("git stash", "git stash", "ALLOW"),
+        ("git checkout main", "git checkout main", "ALLOW"),
+        ("gh pr view", "gh pr view 123", "ALLOW"),
+        ("gh pr diff", "gh pr diff 123", "ALLOW"),
+        ("gh pr list", "gh pr list", "ALLOW"),
+    ]
+
+    for desc, cmd, expected in GIT_ASK_TESTS:
+        tally(run_hook_test(
+            "check-dangerous-commands.py",
+            {"command": cmd},
+            desc,
+            expected,
         ))
 
     hook_commands = load_hook_commands()
@@ -328,7 +391,7 @@ def tally(result):
             "check-secrets-file.py",
             tool_input,
             desc,
-            should_block,
+            "BLOCK" if should_block else "ALLOW",
         ))
 
     # =========================================================================